On stability of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a simple model of the labour market by DE FRANCESCO, MASSIMO ALFIERO
On stability of Bertrand−Nash equilibrium in a simple model
of the labour market 
Massimo A. De Francesco
Department of Economics, University of Siena
Abstract
We examine a Bertrand−Edgeworth model of competition in a labour market where the
workers simultaneously set wages disregarding any influence their current decision may have
on opponents' future decisions. The iterated best response process is shown to converge in
finite time to a Bertrand−Nash solution, where wages are set at the market−clearing level.
This convergence result is also shown to hold when the assumption of static expectations is
replaced by milder restrictions on beliefs about opponents' wages.
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1. Introduction 
Like Cournot (1838), both Bertrand (1883) and Edgeworth (1925) were concerned with 
adjustment processes under duopoly. Since Theocharis (1959) and Fisher (1961), stability of 
Cournot equilibrium under oligopoly has been discussed extensively in terms of iterated best 
responses or more general dynamics. What has prevented similar analyses from being 
applied to price competition is perhaps that “best responses do not always exist in the pure 
Bertrand model” (Qin and Stuart, 1997, p. 503; see also Hehenkamp, Qin, and Stuart, 1999, 
p. 218). This difficulty, however, arises from viewing the price game as a continuous game, 
what in reality is not the case as there exists a minimum fraction of the money unit, however 
small it may be.  
The present paper purports to analyse stability of Bertrand equilibrium in a discontinuous 
game for the labour market where, as in Weibull (1987) and Solow (1990, pp. 53-56), the 
workers simultaneously decide on their wages, whereupon the firm chooses whom to hire. 
We take the workers as playing a repeated wage game, each one myopically maximizing 
current expected utility given his beliefs on his opponents’ wages. It is shown that, under 
static expectations, wages converge over time to the unique Nash equilibrium of the 
constituent game, in which wages are set at the market clearing level. Convergence is also 
shown to hold under much less restrictive assumptions on beliefs. 
  
 
2.  Market clearing at a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of a wage game 
 
We analyse a labour market with n identical workers and a single firm that produces a single 
output under decreasing returns to labour. With Y and L denoting quantities of output and 
labour, we write )L(FY = , with 00 =)(F , and 0>)L('F  and 0<)L(''F  for any nL ≤ . 
{ }niN ,,,,1 KK=  denotes the set of workers, iw  and ic  worker i’s wage rate and income, 
respectively, and il the time spent working, as a fraction of the maximum working time 
allowed by the law. Worker utility is assumed to be ( ))l(mcUU iii −×+= 1 , with 
0   0 ≤′′>′ )(U,)(U  and 0>m  representing the constant marginal rate of substitution 
between income and leisure. For simplicity, the employed are allowed no discretion with 
respect to working time, so 1=il  for the employed. Therefore, utility is )( ii wUU =  for the 
employed and )( mbUU i +=  for the unemployed, with 0≥b  being any benefit granted to 
the latter. Indifference between the two alternatives occurs at the reservation wage 
mbwr += .  
The marginal product of labour is the extra output provided by one additional worker, 
i.e., )L(F)L(F)L(MP −+= 1 . It can either be rwnMP >− )1(  or rw)n(MP ≤−1 ; to save 
space, the former is assumed throughout.1 
We take a preliminary look at the competitive model, where workers and the firm are 
wage takers. Total labour supply is 0)( =wLs  at rww < , nwLs =)(  at rww > , and 
{ }nwLs ,,2,1)( K∈  at rww = . For any )(MPw 0≤ , the profit-maximizing employment, 
denoted )(wL , is such that ))w(L(MPw))w(L(MP 1−≤≤ . )(wL  - and hence labour 
demand, )(wLd  - decreases in a stepwise fashion as w  increases, as in Figure 1. )(wL  is a 
function except at wages )( °= LMPw  for some °L , when { }1,)( +°°∈ LLwL  ; at any such 
wage we take labour demand to be 1)( +°= LwLd .  
                                                          
1 For a more complete analysis, also dealing with the case rw)n(MP ≤−1  - the one studied by Weibull 
(1987) and Solow (1990) –  see De Francesco (2000).  
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We denote ε  the smallest feasible fraction of the money unit. With rw)n(MP >−1 , at 
Walrasian (market-clearing) equilibrium employment is nLw =  and the wage is 
)n(MPww 1 −= . (The latter is slightly inaccurate: indeed, n)w(L)w(L ds ==  at any 
{ }[ ])1(,)(,max n-MP nMP  ww r ε+∈ , while we have identified the Walrasian wage with the 
highest value, )n(MP 1− , in that range.) 
 
                                  w 
                        )0(MP  
 
 
         )1( −= nMPww  
      
                               rw  
                                        0  1    2     3    …  n                                    L              
                                                              Figure 1 
Now we examine the wage game, where the workers simultaneously decide on their 
wages, whereupon the firm chooses whom to hire. As we look for a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium of this two-stage game the decision of whom to hire – the “hiring decision” - is 
made according to a strategy that is optimal for the firm, such that at any wage vector 
)w,...,w,,w( niK1=w  only hiring decisions that maximize profits at w are chosen.  Before 
specifying the firm’s strategy, we must then look closely at the properties of profit-
maximizing hiring decisions.  
Let w be such that )(MPwi 0≤  and )n(MPw j 1−≥  for some Nji ∈, . (Finding optimal 
hiring decisions is trivial when )0(MPwi >  or when )1( −< nMPwi  for all Ni∈ .) We 
identify three critical dimensions of a hiring decision, HL , e
hw , and ulw , these being, 
respectively, employment, the highest wage among the workers employed and the lowest 
wage among the workers unemployed. In fact, three conditions are necessary for the hiring 
decision to be optimal for the firm: (i) )L(MPw H
he 1−≤ , otherwise it would pay to reduce 
employment by laying-off the most expensive worker hired; (ii) eu hl ww ≥ , otherwise it 
would pay to replace the most expensive worker hired with the least expensive unemployed 
worker; (iii) )L(MPw H
lu ≥ , otherwise it would pay to increase employment by hiring the 
least expensive unemployed worker.2  
Denote )(LH w , )(w e
h
°w  and )(w ul °w , respectively, the levels of HL , e
hw , and ulw  
resulting, at w, from the optimal strategy selected by the firm. This strategy is assumed to be 
such that, at any w, the firm picks with equal probability any optimal hiring decision, or, 
whenever applicable, any of the optimal hiring decisions involving the highest level of 
employment. To see how this rule works, consider vectors w involving several optimal 
                                                          
2 Sufficiency of these conditions can also be easily checked. 
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hiring decisions. Then, HL  is normally the same for all optimal hiring decisions. For 
example, let )w,...,w(=w , with nL)L(MPw ≤∀≠    . Each of the 



HL
n
 hiring decisions 
with )L(MPw)L(MP:L HHH 1−<<  is optimal and is chosen with the same probability, so 
that each worker is hired with probability n/LH . But look now at  
{ } { })L(MPw:i#L)L(MPw:i:# ii °≤<°≤°<w  for some nL <° . Then, there are two types of 
profit-maximizing hiring decisions, those with °= LLH , )L(MPw e
h
°≤  and )L(MPw ul °= , 
and those with 1+°= LLH , )L(MPw e
h
°=  and )L(MPw ul °≥ ; according to the strategy 
specified above, the firm chooses with equal probability any of the latter. For example, let 
)L(MPw:)w,...,w( °==w  for some nL <° . Then, although hiring decisions with °= LLH  
are also optimal, the firm chooses any of those with 1+°= LLH , and hence 1+°= L)(LH w . 
At any wage vector )w,...,w,...,w( ni1=w , worker i’s expected utility is 
( ) ( ) ( )( )www ereii ip)w(Uip)w(UUE −+= 1 , where ( )weip  stands for i’s probability of 
being hired at w . The following result is easily established.  
 
Proposition 1.  The Walrasian wage vector ),...,( www ww=w   is an equilibrium of the game.  
 
Proof. Replying ww  to )w,...,w( wwwi =−w  yields ( ) )w(UUE wwi =w , which is higher than 
both ( ) )w(U,wwUE rwiwii => −w  or ( ) )w(U,wwUE iwiwii =< −w .                              QED 
 
The next step is to show that any www ≠  is not an equilibrium. Some w are immediately 
disposed of. Note that, irrespective of i−w , ( ) )w(U,wwUE wiwii == −w . In view of this, 
any wage wi ww <  is a strictly dominated strategy as ( ) )w(U,wwUE iiwii =< −w ; and the 
same holds for any )(MPwi 0>  as ( ) )w(U),(MPwUE riii => −w0 .  
There remain wage vectors ( ) )(MPww:w,...,w,...,w iwni 01 ≤°≤°°°=°w  for all Ni∈ . 
We now introduce two particular functions of °w ,  denoted )('w °w  and )(''w °w , where 
( ){ }ε−°°=° )(w ,)(LMPmax)(' w ehH www  and ( ){ }ε−°−°=° )(w ,)(LMPmin)('' w ulH www 1 . 
Note that )('w °w  is the highest wage which any ( ) 1<°wejp:j  might have replied to 
°
− jw  to be hired with unit probability; similarly, )(''w °w  is the highest wage which would 
result in any ( ) 1=°wejp:j  being hired with unit probability in the face of °− jw .  
With www >° , there obviously exists some j: ( ) 1<°wejp . The following two results 
show that any such worker should have quoted a lower wage.  
 
Lemma 1.  At www >° , any j: ( ) 10 <°< wejp  has failed to make a best reply to °− jw , this 
instead being )('w °w .  
 
Proof. As regards notation, °jw  here denotes the wage quoted at °w  by any j: 
( ) 10 <°< wejp . It must be understood that ( ) 10 <°< wejp  for any 
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{ }( ) { }( )°<°∈<°<−°≤°∈ jijji ww:Ni#MPwww:Ni#MP:j 1 .3 Indeed, when this 
condition holds, optimal hiring decisions are those with °== j
lh www ue , differing only in 
terms of who is hired amongst the workers quoting °jw ; employment is 
( ) ( )1−°≤°<°° )(LMPw)(LMP :)(L HjHH www  and, given that each optimal hiring 
decision is chosen with a positive probability, ( ) 10 <°< wejp  for each of the workers 
quoting °jw .  
In the present case, εε −°=−°=° j
h w)(w)('w e ww , hence 
( ) )w(U),(' wwUE jjjj ε−°=°°= −ww  for any j: ( ) 1<°wejp .4 As to j: ( ) 10 <°< wejp , 
negligibility of ε  implies ( ) ( ) ( )( )°−+°°=° www erejj jp)w(Ujp)w(UUE 1 < )w(U j ε−° , 
so that ε−°jw  is a better reply than °jw . Besides, ε−°jw  is actually the best reply, as ( ) )w(U,wwUE rjjjj =°°> −w  and ( ) ( )jjjjj wU,wwUE =°−°< −wε , both of which are 
lower than )w(U j ε−° .                                                                                                   QED 
 
Lemma 2.  At www >° , any j: ( ) 0=°wejp  has failed to make a best reply to °− jw , this 
instead being )('w °w . 
 
Proof.  Here °jw  denotes the wage quoted at °w  by any ( ) 0 =°wejp:j . With www >° , 
nLL wH =<°)(w ; therefore, ( ) wH wLMP ≥°)(w , in turn implying that ww)(' w ≥°w . 
Consequently, for any j: ( ) 0=°wejp , )(' w °w  is a better reply than °jw , given that ( ) )w(U)' w(U),(' wwUE wjjj ≥=°°= −ww  while ( ) )w(UUE rj =°w . Moreover, )(' w °w  
is readily seen to be the unique best reply to °
− jw . While obviously ( ) ( )°°<>°°=
−− jjjjjj ),(' wwUE),(' wwUE wwww , the argument showing that 
( ) ( )°°>>°°=
−− jjjjjj ),(' wwUE),(' wwUE wwww  is slightly different depending whether 
( ))(LMP)(' w H °=° ww  or ε−°=° )(w)(' w eh ww . In the former case, ( ) )(L),(' wwL HjjH °=°°> − www  and ( ) 01 =°°> −w,wwjp jje , given that 
( ) )(w)(LMPw ehHj °>°> ww ; consequently, ( ) )w(U),(' wwUE rjjj =°°> −ww . Turn now 
to the latter case, where )(w)(' w eh °=+° ww ε . First, along similar lines it is argued that 
( ) )w(U ,)(' wwUE rjjj =°+°> −ww ε . Second, ( ) )(L,)('wwL HjjH °=°+°= − www ε  and 
( ) 10 <°+°=<
− jje ,)(' wwjp ww ε : indeed, if ( ) 0=°wejp:j  changes to quoting 
)(w)(' w eh °=+° ww ε  employment remains unchanged as ( ))(LMP)(w Hhe °>° ww , with j 
now competing with the other worker(s) quoting )(w eh °w . Making use of Lemma 1, we thus 
have ( ) ( )°°=<°+°=
−− jjjjjj ),(' wwUE,)(' wwUE wwww ε .                                     QED 
                                                          
3 It may be useful to explain this notation in simple words: for example, { }( )°<°∈ ji ww:Ni#MP  denotes 
the marginal product of labour when the workers employed are those who quoted wages lower than °jw .  
4 Incidentally, )(' w)('' w °=° ww  in the  present case, as one can easily check; therefore, ε−° )(w eh w  is 
also the highest wage that would have led to any ( ) 1=°wejp:j  being hired with unit probability.  
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The next proposition  follows immediately from Proposition 1 and Lemmas 1 and 2. 
 
Proposition 2.   The Walrasian wage vector ww  is the unique equilibrium of the game. 
 
Thus, as is often the case with Bertrand oligopoly models (see, for example, Vives, 
1986), at the unique equilibrium of the wage game, wages are set at the market-clearing 
level. A further result is now provided, which will be used subsequently.  
 
Lemma 3.   At www >° , for any j: ( ) 1=°wejp  the unique best reply to °− jw  is )('' w °w .  
 
Proof.  This result is derived straightforwardly from the preceding ones by means of a 
simple experiment. Let any ( ) 1=°wejp:j  change to quoting )(''ww j °> w , so that the 
wage vector becomes ( )°°>
− jj ),(''ww ww . Then ( ) 1 0 <°°>≤ − jje ),(''wwjp ww  - recall 
that )(''w °w  represents the highest wage resulting in any ( ) 1=°wejp:j  certainly being 
hired given °
− jw . By Lemmas 1 and 2, at wage vectors ( )°°> − jj ),(''ww ww  worker j has 
not made a best reply, this instead being the highest wage resulting in j certainly being hired 
in the face of °
− jw , i.e., ( )°°> − jj ),(''ww'w ww  . Of course, ( ) )(''w),(''ww'w jj °=°°> − www     as the highest wage leading to a worker certainly being 
hired only depends on his opponents’ strategy profile; hence )(''w °w  is the best reply for 
any ( ) 1=°wejp:j .                                                                                                     QED 
3.  Convergence to Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a repeated wage game 
 
It is now shown how repetition of the wage game might lead to the emergence of Bertrand 
equilibrium. As in Bertrand (1883) and Edgeworth (1912) analyses of duopoly, each worker 
is assumed to be concerned with the current payoff of his wage decision. Therefore, the 
wage decision depends on the wages that the other workers are expected to quote in the 
current period. These expectations in turn depend on past wages, about which each worker 
has perfect information.  
Furthermore, in each period the firm follows the optimal strategy specified above. 
Consequently, there is no path dependency in hiring decisions. For example, with a wage 
vector w)w,...,w( ww >=  constant over time, each worker is hired with probability 
n/)(LH w  in each period, no matter who was hired in the past. 
Variables are now indexed by the time period –  )t(w  is the wage vector in period t, 
)t(LH  the corresponding level of employment (i. e., ))t((L)t(L HH w= , )t(w e
h  the highest 
wage among worker hired ( ))t((w)t(w ee hh w= ), and so on. Further, )t(wˆ  denotes the 
highest wage call in period t. In view of the analysis above, w)t( ww ≥ . Initially, stability of 
Bertrand equilibrium is established under static expectations.     
 
Proposition 3.    With static expectations:  
(a) )t(wˆ)t(wˆ <+1  when w)t( ww > ;  
(b) w*)tt( ww =≥ , for t*  large enough.  
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Proof. (a) Let w)t( ww > . With static expectations, Lemmas 1 and 2 imply 
( ){ }ε−==+ )t(w,)t(LMPmax)t('w)t(w ehHj   1  for ( ) 1 <)t(jp:j e w , while Lemma 3 
implies ( ){ }ε−−==+ )t(w,)t(LMPmin)t(''w)t(w ulHj  1 1  for ( ) 1 =)t(jp:j e w . Both 
)t('w  and )t(''w  are lower than )t(wˆ , as can be easily checked; hence )t(wˆ)t(wˆ <+1 .                   
 
(b) With w)( ww >0 , from repeated application of (a) it follows that  
ww *)t(;)*t(:*t wwww =>−>∃ 10 . Furthermore, w*)tt( ww => : since everyone at t* has 
made a best reply, everyone continues to quote ww  at t*+1, and thereafter.                 QED 
 
From the proof of part (a) of the above proposition it follows immediately that 
)t(w)t(w jj <+1  for ( ) 1 <)t(jp:j e w  while )t(w)t(w jj >+1  for )t(''w)t(w:j j   < . 
Consequently, under static expectations many wage estimates are biased in disequilibrium. 
As these biases are likely to be noticed, it is important to see whether the stability result just 
obtained remains once the assumption of static expectations is removed. The analysis below 
provides – first under single-valued expectations and then introducing subjective uncertainty 
- more general conditions that are sufficient for stability.  
Denote )t(jj 1+−w  worker j’s single-valued expectations on the wages quoted at 1+t  by 
all ji ≠ ; its generic component, )t(w ji 1+ , is the wage that j expects i to quote. 
Furthermore, ( ))t('w jjj 1+−w  denotes the highest wage leading to j being hired with unit 
probability in  the face of )t(jj 1+−w . We then have the following result. 
 
Proposition 4.   Let expectations be such that, with w)t( ww ≥ ,                 
             { } Nj     )t(L)t(wˆ)t(w:i# :)t( Hjijj ∈∀≥≤++− 11w .                                       (1) 
This is sufficient  for:  
(a) )t(wˆ)t(wˆ <+1  when w)t( ww > ;  
(b) w*)tt( ww =≥ , for *t  large enough.  
 
Proof. (a) To start with, note that ))t(L(MP)t(wˆ H>  when 
wt ww >)( . Also, Lemmas 1, 2 
and 3 straightforwardly imply that ( ) Nj)t('w)t(w jjjj ∈∀+=+ −   11 w ; therefore, to prove 
that )t(wˆ)t(wˆ <+1  it has to be shown that ( ) Nj)t(wˆ)t('w jjj ∈∀<+−   1w . Suppose to the 
contrary that ( ) )t(wˆ)t('w jjj ≥+− 1w  for some j. This being so, at wage vector ( ))t(),t(wˆw jjj 1+= −w  at t+1, worker j is hired with unit probability and the same must 
then be true for any )t(wˆ)t(w:i ji ≤+1 . Taking account of (1), this implies that ( ) )t(L)t(),t(wˆwL HjjjH >+= − 1w  - employment at the stipulated wage vector is higher than 
at t – so that ( ) − +=> )t(),t(wˆwLMP))t(L(MP jjjHH 1w . Recalling that 
))t(L(MP)t(wˆ H> , this in turn implies that ( )11 −+=>  − )(t(t),wˆwLMP)t(wˆ jjjH w , 
which violates condition (i) for profit maximization. Therefore, the conjecture that ( ) )t(wˆ)t('w jjj ≥+− 1w  must be rejected to avoid this contradiction.  
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(b) With w)( ww >0 , repeated application of (a) leads to the conclusion that 
ww *)t(;)*t(:*t wwww =>−>∃ 10 . Then, it is easily seen that condition (1) implies static 
expectations concerning wage quotes made at 1+*t ; consequently, everyone will quote ww  
at 1+*t , and thereafter.                                                                                              QED 
  
 
We now move a step forward by relaxing the assumption of single-valued expectations. 
To deal with subjective uncertainty, let )t(B j 1+  denote worker j’s set of beliefs at date t+1 
on the wages that the other workers are about to quote in period t+1, )t(B)t( jji 11 +∈+β  
worker j’s belief about worker i’s wage in t+1, )t(S ji 1+  the support of )t(
j
i 1+β , i.e., the 
set of wages that j believes will be quoted with positive probability by i in t+1, )t(w ji 1+  
any )t(S)t(w jii 11 +∈+ , and )t(
j
j 1+−w  any ∏
≠
−
+∈+
ji
j
ij )t(S)t( 11w . The following 
result is a generalization of Proposition 4.  
 
Proposition 5.   Let beliefs be such that, with w)t( ww ≥ ,  
         { }{ } Nj)t(L)t(wˆ,...,w,w)t(S:i:#)t(B Hwwjij ∈∀≥+⊆++      11 ε .                       (2) 
This is sufficient for:  
(a) )(ˆ)1(ˆ twtw <+  when w)t( ww > ;  
(b) w*)tt( ww =≥ for t* large enough. 
 
Proof.     See Appendix.  
 
It is worth spelling out the restriction on beliefs imposed by condition (2) – which includes 
(1) as a special case: with w)t( ww ≥ , each worker expects his opponents’ wages will 
certainly not exceed )t(wˆ  at t+1, for at least as many of them as were employed in t. This 
restriction seems reasonable and is consistent with simple learning procedures. Just to give 
an example, beliefs might be such that any worker is expected certainly not to switch to a 
wage that, if quoted in the previous period, would not have raised his expected utility. In 
such a case, any j  rules out the event of any ji ≠  quoting more than )t(wˆ  in t+1 because i 
would have obtained an expected utility of ( ))t(UE)w(U ir w≤  by quoting such a wage at t.  
Further, and most important, restriction (2) on beliefs is never contradicted during the 
adjustment process, given that in fact it implies )(ˆ)1(ˆ twtw <+ .  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We have explored stability of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a simple labour market 
containing n wage-setting workers. The iterated best response process has been shown to 
converge in finite time to the unique equilibrium of the constituent game, in which wages are 
set at the market-clearing level. Also, convergence has been shown to still hold under milder 
restrictions on each worker’s beliefs about his opponents’ wages.  
Two limitations of our analysis are worth bearing in mind. First, the market-clearing 
wage has been assumed to be higher than the reservation wage. This was just for the sake of 
brevity; we are confident that similar convergence results would also obtain if the market-
clearing wage were equal to the reservation wage. Second, it has been assumed, for 
simplicity, that there was only one firm operating in the labour market. Whether similar 
convergence results would hold in the multi-firm case is a task we leave for future research.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 5.   (a) What needs to be shown is that, with w)t( ww > , condition (2) 
implies Nj)t(wˆ)t(w j ∈∀<+   1 . Denote ( ))t(B,wjp jje 1+  and ( ))t(B,wUE jjj 1+ , 
respectively, worker j’s probability of being hired and expected utility in period t+1, 
conditional on jw  and j’s beliefs. When quoting )t(wˆ  expected utility is 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ))t(B),t(wˆjp)w(U)t(B),t(wˆjp))t(wˆ(U)t(B),t(wˆUE jerjejj 1111 +−×++×=+ .     (3) 
 
In this equation either ( ) 01 =+ )t(B),t(wˆjp je  or ( ) 110 ≤+< )t(B),t(wˆjp je . If the former 
occurs, j’s optimal reply is readily seen to be some wage lower than )t(wˆ : indeed, 
( ) )w(U)t(B),t(wˆwUE rjjj =+≥ 1 , whereas, for example, ( ) )w(U)t(B,wUE wjwj =+1 .  
Turn now to the case where ( ) 110 ≤+< )t(B),t(wˆjp je . Note that this probability can 
be written as   
 ( ) { }( )
{ }( )
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which reduces to 
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as { }( ) 011 =≥<++
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je w . First of all, it must be noted that 
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je w  so that, by equation (4), 
( ) 11 <+ )t(B),t(wˆjp je . Assume, to the contrary, that 
{ }( ) 111 =<<++
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j
i
j
je w . Then, at wage vectors 
{ }( ))t(L)t(wˆ)t(w:i:#)t( ),t(wˆ Hjijj <<++− 11w , any )t(wˆ)t(w:i ji ≤+1  would also be 
hired with unit probability. This in turn implies that { }( ) )t(L)t(L)t(wˆ)t(w:i:#)t();t(wˆL HHjijjH ><<++− 11 w  given that, by condition (2), { } )t(L)t(wˆ)t(w:i# Hji ≥≤+1  with unit probability. As one can easily check, the result just 
achieved leads to the same contradiction as in the proof of Proposition 1. To avoid the 
 10
contradiction, it must then be that  { }( ) 1110 <<<++<
−
)t(L)t(wˆ)t(w:i:#)t( ),t(wˆjp H
j
i
j
je w .  
Now we see that, with ( ) 110 <+< )t(B),t(wˆjp je , worker j’s best reply is again some 
wage strictly less than )t(wˆ .  A wage higher than )t(wˆ  is a worse reply than )t(wˆ : indeed, 
it follows immediately from (2) that ( ) )w(U)t(B),t(wˆwUE rjjj =+> 1 , whereas 
( ) )w(U)t(B),t(wˆwUE rjjj >+= 1  in the present case in which ( ) 01 >+ )t(B),t(wˆjp je . 
On the other hand, there is some wage lower than )t(wˆ  yielding more than )t(wˆ . One such 
wage is ε−)t(wˆ , as we now see.  Worker j’s probability of being hired at this wage is  
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On reflection, it follows from { }( ) 1110 <<<++<
−
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je wε  (see the proof of Lemma 
1). Equation (5) thus becomes  
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By comparing (6) with (4) it is seen that ( ) ( ))t(B),t(wˆjp)t(B,)t(wˆjp jeje 11 +>+− ε . 
Now write expected utility when quoting  ε−)t(wˆ :  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
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Recalling that ( ) ( ))t(B),t(wˆjp)t(B,)t(wˆjp jeje 11 +>+− ε  and the negligibility of ε , by 
comparing (7) with (3) it is seen that ( ) ( ))t(B),t(wˆUE)t(B,)t(wˆUE jjjj 11 +>+− ε .  
 
(b) With w)( ww >0 , repeated application of (a) leads us to conclude that 
ww *)t(;)*t(:*t wwww =>−>∃  10  for t* large enough. At t*+1, condition (2) amounts to 
saying that { } Nj,iw)*t(S wji ∈∀=+   1 , i.e., each worker has static expectations about 
wages quoted in t*+1. Therefore, since everyone has made a best reply at t*, everyone 
continues quoting ww  at t*+1, and thereafter.                                                                QED 
